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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

:e

~2

GIBBO~S

AND REED

CO~IPANY,

a Ptah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant.
vs.
~1

.

UTAH STATE ROAD
COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
12478

:o

Brief of Plaintiff and Appellant
2.
3
6:

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the meaning and effect of a provision in highway construction contract.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN TRIAL COURT
Following trial without a jury the court entered a
judgment of dismissal, no cause of action.
1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal and remand with directions
to enter judgment for the plaintiff and appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For many years it has been the practice of the Utah
State Road Commission, hereinafter called "the Commission," to publish standard specifications for road and
bridge construction and incorporate them in its contracts. A 1960 edition was used until March 1968 when
the Commission published a new "Standard Specification for Road and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue."
This action involves the interpretation of a contractual provision introduced into the interim specifications
to change the method of measuring and paying for
"compaction and backfill," i.e., placing soil around structures and pipes and compacting it to the required den·
sity.
In Section 6-:n of the 1960 Specifications (Ex. ti·
P) such work had not been identified as compaction and
backfill but as "mechanical tamping," paid for at an
agreed price per hour. The price was to be full compen·
sation for furnishing and operating the equipment, as
well as work incidental to backfilling and not included
in other contract items.
This type of specification is referred to by the Road
Commission as a "method" specification ( R. I U) inas·
much as the contract prescribes just what will be done i11
2
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L'u1111uis~iu11 aduptcJ a11 ··e11d result .. type ~vtcificatiu11
for compaction and lmckfill which nu longer used an
hourly rate as the basis of payment. The new section
(Ex. 2-P) proYide<l for payment by the cubic yard:

"208.03 1ll etlwd uf i~I easnrement: 'Compaction'
shall be measme<l by cubic yard. The quantity
shall be the rnlume of the 'Roadway Excavation,'
'Structural Excavation,' and 'Borrow,' placed on
the roadway embankment measured in its original position, less the amount paid for 'Backfill.'
~ o payment will be made for material not compacted, such as waste, material used for surcharges, or initial layer over soft ground placed
for a working platform for equipment. For compaction through cuts, or the natural ground under
embankments, the quantity shall be the product
of the compacted area, and a compacted depth of
8 inches.
"Backfill shall be measured b~· the cubic yard of
material in final position in excavated area or embankment adjacent to a structure limited as follows:
"On fittings, abutments, piers, box culverts, payments shall be limited to the area bounded by vertical plains one foot outside the footings to the
height of the material placed adjacent to the
structure. No payment shall be made for material
placed :tbove the eleYation of the top of box culverts or other buried structures except pipe.
"On pipes, the measurements shall be limited to
vertical plains two feet wider than the outside
JJipe diameter and one-half of the pipe diameter
01 er the top of the pipe, limited to two feet."
(Emphasis added)
1
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Sometime before l\lay 21, IU08, the Commission invited contractors lo bid on a coutraet for construction o!
a portion of the belt route in Salt Lake City. To be incorporated in the c.:ontract was "Standard Specificatiom
for Road and Bridge Construction, Interim Issue,
.March HW8.'. The plaintiff, hereinafter sometimes called
"the Company," was a bidder for the project.
To prepare its bid under the uew "end result" spec.:ification it was necessary for the Company to proceed
in three steps: first, it determined the total cost of labor
and equipment needed to perform the compaction and
backfill operations; second, it determined the number of
units, i.e., the number of cubic yards for which payment
was to be made under the specification; and third, it divided the total costs by the number of cubic yards to ar·
rive at a price per cubic yard to be included in its bid
(R. 72)
In determining the number of cubic yards for whiclt
it would be paid the Company had to decide whether tu
include or exclude the Yolume of the pipes around whicl1
backfill was to be placed and compacted. The Company's
estimators were aware that the rectangle described ill
section 208.03 would not accurately reflect the amount
of material actually placed, but was an arbitrary de·
scription used to proYide simplicity in computing
amounts to be irn1d, eliminating the need of measuring
actual quautities. ::\Iorc<n-er, c\·cn if the volume of the
l)ipe was to be inclu<ll'd for computation purposes, t!Jt
arbitrary, c.:ornputcd <1uantity represents less than half tll
4
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the amount of backfill actually placed and compacted
1R. 79, Exs. 15-P and 16-P). The specifications were
discussed by the Company's estimators, who concluded
that the volume of the pipe would not be deducted and
that they would be paid for all materials within the boundaries of the rectangle described in Section 208.03 (R.
78). They made their computations accordingly. Had
they deducted for the volume of the pipe the unit price,
of course, would have been considerably higher.
Among the factors that led the Company estimators
lo that conclusion were these: In both the 1960 and 1968
specifications for "underdrains," which are substantially
lhe same as pipes insofar as the backfill operation is concerned ( R. 102), there is an express provision requiring
deduction of the quantity displaced by the pipe (Ex. 4P, Sec. 6-2.4 and Ex. 2-P, Sec. 602.05); the quantity to
bepaid for was still less than that actually to be placed;
in computing quantities for "roadway excavation" there
is no deduction for pipes in the excavated areas; in paying for concrete the Commission makes no deduction for
pipes located within the concrete; and in an item relating
to excavation for salvaging and relaying pipe, the volume
of the pipe is paid for as part of the excavation (R. 95).
The Company did not contact the Commission to
obtain an interpretation of Section 208.03 because attempts to obtain interpretations in the past had not been
satisfactory ( R. 91). Moreover, since the contract was
to be awarded on the basis of competitive bidding, it
would have been unfair to give an interpretation of the

5

clause only to Gibbons and Reed Company; and it is the
policy of the Commission to try and a void discussing the
meanings of contractual provisions with contracton
prior to bid openings unless the information in such dhcussions can be passed on to all of the other bidders, the
Commission recognizing that otherwise one bidder would
have an advantage over the others (R. 117).
Gibbons and Reed Company submitted the low bici
on the project and on May 24, 1968, was awarded the
contract ( R. US). 'Vork commenced on June 4, 1968,
and in August or September it was learned by the Company's project manager that the Commission, in computing backfill quantities for progress payments wa)
paying the Company on the basis of the rectangular figure described in 208.03, less the volume of the pipe. Se~
Exhibits 15-P and 16-P. The differences between the
parties' interpretations of 208.03 was thereupon pointea
out by the Company project manager to Stewart H
Knowlton, the Commission's resident engineer in charge
of the project ( R. 80, 100) .
.Mr. Knowlton was aware of the provision. Then
had been some discussion about it within his own organ·
ization but he wasn't sure whether the discussions wer1
had before or after those with the contractor (R. 99!
Some of Mr. Knowlton's "key people" had questiow
about the meaning of the specification ( R. 101). Br
cause of the disagreement among his staff l\Ir. Knowl·
ton called the District Constrnction Engineer and Chirt
of Design Crew Section and was told that the specific:i
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tions should be interpreted to exclude the volume of the
pipe (R. 101).
After raising the question orally with the resident
engineer ( R. 112), the company wrote a letter questioning the Commission's interpretation (Ex. 8-P). This
generated some inter-office correspondence within the
Department of Highways.
On October 14, 1968, the resident engineer wrote a
memorandum (Ex. 10-P) to J. B. Skewes, Engineer
for Construction. Referring to the specification the resident engineer said:
"The wording and intent of the specifications on
backfill on pipes came up for discussion in this
office soon after the contract on this project was
awarded. It was further discussed with personnel and other echelons of the department. While
it was generally agreed that it was intended that
the volume of pipe should be deducted from the
measurement between vertical planes two feet
wider than the outside of the pipe, some disagreement was evidenced as to the clarity of the actual
wording.
"In view of the controversy subsection 208.03 has
raised it is requested that the provision be reviewed at departmental level and a decision published as to whether the volume of the pipe be deducted or included for payment." (Emphasis
added)
The memornndum was routed through Kenneth
Hepworth, District Two Construction Engineer. In
eommenting upon the question raised by the contractor,
~Ir. Hepworth said:
7

"It is believed the \\'hole of the specif ica ti on must
be considered, and that in this instance the word,
'material and 'adjacent' cannot be disregarded. I1
is reasonable that the word 'material' in this specification is intended to refer to the actual soil u1
aggregate to be placed around the pipe and doe1
not refer to the pipe itself or the air within the
pipe. The word 'adjacent' means 'next to' ana
does not mean 'within' and, therefore, is a limiting
factor in determination of the backfill to be paid
for.

"In view of the foregoing it is recommended that:
"I. The contractor's request for payment of the

Yolume occupied by the pipe be denied.

"2. That the specifications be written to either

include or to exclude the volume of the pipe
in the method uf measurement of the backfill.

"3. That a limiti11g plane below the pipe also be
included in the method of measurement. Thi1
to circumvent the possibility of a contractur
requesting payment for backfill from the na·
tural ground where pipes are placed in em·
bankment sections." (Emphasis added)
.Mr. Hepworth made the recommendation because
"contractors and other people" often adopt meaning1
which "tend to hlYor their position," but he admitted that
it is not his habit to recommend changes in specificatiom
each time a contractor questions the meaning of a speci·
fication ( R. 128).
The recommendation in fact led to a change in the
wording of 208.0:3. In X m·ember, 1968, supplemental
specifications to the interim issue of the Standard Speci·
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i'ications were published. The questioned prov1s10n in
:iubsection 208.03 was amended to read as follows:

"BrJC!tfill shall be measured by the cubic vard of
material in final position in excavated area: or embankment adjacent to a structure limited as follows:***
"On pipes, the measurement shall be limited to
vertical planes two feet wider than the outside
pipe diameter and one-half the pipe diameter over
the top of the pipe, limited to two feet. The measurement shall only include the material placed
and the volume of the pipe shall be excluded."
(Ex. 3-P.)
The Commission and its resident engineer recognized that the Company and its employees to be skilled
and competent. Mr. Kearns, the Company's project
manager, was "a very competent, energetic, capable executive" who maintained a close relationship with the
resident engineer during construction of the complicated project (R. 111). Mr. Skewes found Gibbons and
Reed Company to be skilled and competent contractors
(R. 119).

The Gibbons and Reed contract was not the only
one in which the question of inclusion or exclusion of the
pipe volume was of concern to the Commission. Mr. Carl
Fonnesbeck, the Commission's resident engineer in Tremonton was in charge of a contract with Fife Construction Company. In sending in his first two estimates for
backfill quantities. Mr. Fonnesbeck computed the quantities by including the volume of the pipe, but was told

9

by the Commission thereafter to deduct for the volume
of the pipe ( R. 129).
\Vhen it became clear that the Road Commissiu1.
was not going to make payment for the quantities 3,
computed by Gibbons and Reed Company this action
was initiated. In its action for a declaratory judgment
the Company took the position that the contract shoulu
be interpreted as not providing for deduction of the vo].
ume of the pipe; and that at the very least, the contract
was ambiguous and, having been prepared by the Corn.
mission, should be given effect as interpreted by the
Company if such an interpretation was a reasonable one.
In late 1969, both parties moved for summary judg·
ment. The respective motions were heard on November
14, 1969, following which the court denied both motiom
on the ground that there were genuine issues of material
fact to be determined, indicating that in the court's opin·
ion the contract was ambiguous and required factual
matters for a resolution of the ambiguity.
The case was tried to the court on March 11, 1971.
and notwithstanding the oyerwhelming, unrebutted eri·
dence (including admissions by the Commission) that
the contract was ambiguous, the court entered a judg·
ment of dismissal, in effect adopting the interpretation
of the Road Commission. The judgment was based upon
the following finding and conclusion:
"The aboYe specifications are not ambiguous anll
were eorrcetl~, interpreted by def end ant by meal·
urincr
the outside climensions of the planes de·
I:">
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scribed in 208.03 and deducting therefrom the
volume displaced by the pipe thereby paying only
for the actual material in final position as required
by the specification. * * *
"Specification 208.03 of the Interim Standard
Specifications, March 1968, is not ambiguous and
the procedure followed by defendant in deducting the volume of the pipe was a correct interpretation of the specification 208.03." ( R. 48.)
Having found the contract to be clear and certain,
the Court made no finding with respect to the reasonableness of the interpretation placed upon the provision
by appellant.

ARGCl\IENT
I
1-'he court's firuling that the specifications of the
contract relating to measurement of backfill were not
ambiguous is 1insupported by the evidence and is contrary to law.
Except with respect to the most simple agreements,
it is almost impossible for a court to interpret a contract
without taking into account a number of extrinsic facts
and circumstances, including the situation of the parties,
the apparent purpose of the contract, and their prior
eontracting experiences. The approach was well desrribed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Bay
Pctroleuni Corporation v. May, 286 P.2d 269 (Okla.
1955), as follows:
11

"In considering this transaction we must plac~
ourselves as far as possible in the position of tlit
parties when the contract was entered into anti
consider the instrument itself as drawn, its pur
poses, and the circumstances surrounding th1
transactiou, and, from a consideration of all the
elements determine upon what sense or meanin1,
of the terms used their minds actually met." id.

:i

271.

Modern courts and writers recognize that the question of "ambiguity' should not be determined solely upon
a particular judge's experience with the use of the language, or by dictionary definitions, since meanings frequently change and within certain industries and professions specialized meanings arise.
Professor Arthur L. Corbin in his treatise point1
out that words in a contract seldom have "only one true
meaning.'' See 3 Corbin on Contracts §§535, 536:
"Sometimes it is saicl that 'the courts will not dis·
regard the plain language of a contract or inter·
palate something not contained in it.' also 'the
courts wili not write contracts for the parties tu
them or construe them other than in accordance
with the plain and literal meaning of the languagt
used.' It is true that when a judge reads the word~
of a contract he may jump to the instant and con·
fident opinion that they have but one reasonable
meaping and that he knows what it is. A greatrr
familiarity with dictionaries and the usage o!
words, a .better understanding of the uncertain·
ties of language, and a c<nnparative study of more
cases in the field of interpretation, will make onr
beware of holding such an opinion so recklessh
arrived at. * * *
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"* * * it can hardly be insisted on too of ten and
too vigorously that language at its best is always
a defective and uncertain instrument, that words
do not define themselves that terms and sentences
consist of the ideas that they induce in the minds
of some indivi<lual person who uses or hears or
reads them, and that seldom in a litigated case do
the words of a contract convey one identical meaning to the two contracting parties or to third persons. Therefore, it is invariably necessary, before
a court can give any meaning to the words of a
contract and can select one meaning rather than
other possible ones as the basis for the determination of rights and other legal effects, that extrinsic evidence shall be heard to make the court
aware of the 'surrounding circumstances,' including the persons, objects and events to which the
words can be applied and which caused the words
to be used."
In a recent law review article "The Interpretation
of \V ords and the Parol Evidence Rule," 50 Cornell
L.Q. 161 ( 1965) Professor Corbin gives further treatment to the problem:
"First and foremost, extrinsic evidence is always
necessary in the interpretation of a written instrument: In determining the meaning and intention
of the parties who executed or relied upon it, in
applying it to the objects and perso~s invol~ed in
the litigated or otherwise disputed issues, m determining the specific legal operation that justice
requires to be given to the written instrument .. In
this process of interpretation, no relevant credible
evidence is inadmissible merely because it is extrinsic; all such evidence is necessarily extrinsic.
\Vhen a court makes the often repeated statement
13

that the written words are so plain and clear anu
ambiguous that they need no interpretation an1[
that evid~nce is not admissible, it is making an in·
terpretat10n on the sole basis of the extrinsic evi.
dence of its own linguistic experience and educa.
tion, of which it merely takes judicial notice." id.
at 188-189.
In the instant case two district court judges (in.
eluding the one who entered the challenged finding) be·
lieved there was sufficient doubt as to the contract'~
meaning that extrinsic evidence was required. But in the
final analysis the trial judge closed his mind to the evi·
dence adduced and interpreted the contract on the sole
basis of his own linguistic experience.
In its original inter-off ice memorandum and in ih
argument to the court the Commission, in interpretin~
Section 208.03 reasoned as follows: the important words
are "material in final position in excavated area or em·
bankment adjacent to a structure," and inasmuch as ma·
terial cannot be adjacent to a structure if it is within it
the volume of the pipe must be deducted.
But the paragraph can be read in at least two dif·
f erent ways. The section provides:
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yard ol
material in final position in excavated area or eni·
bankment adjacent to a structure limited as fol·
lows:
"On fittings, abutments, piers, box culverts, pay·
ment shall be limited to the area bounded by ve1"
tical planes one foot outside the footings to tl1t
height of the material placed adjacent to the
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structure. No payment shall be made fm material
placed above the elevation of the top of box culverts or other buried structures except pipe.
"On pipes, the measurements shall be limited to
vertical planes two feet wider than the outside
pipe diameter and one-half of the pipe diameter
over the top of the pipe, limited to two feet."
The three paragraphs merit some analysis. The
Commission assumes that "adjacent to a structure" applies to "material in excavated areas," but the first paragraph above quoted is not that clear. The first sentence is
so written that the phrase "adjacent to a structure" seems
to modify only "embankment" and not "material in final
position."
This construction makes sense because the second
paragraph relates entirely to embankment placed next
to footings, abutments, piers and box culverts, and the
paragraph again expressly refers to material "adjacent
to the structure."
But in the third paragraph, relating to pipes, which
are located in "excavated areas," there is no reference to
material ''adjacent to the structure" or "'adjacent to the
pipe."
Moreover, the evidence shows that if payment were
to be made for all "material in final position in the excayated area" the company would have been entitled to
more money than with payment limited to the rectangle
tles<'l'ibed in the last paragraph.
The use of the word "limited" in the three para15

graphs is of some significance. "Limited" means "to a).
sign to or within certain limits." The word "limit" implie1
"a point in space, time, speed or the like, beyond whicn
a person or thing cannot go or is not permitted to go.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary ( 1961 Ed.) p. 48R
The provision for measurement of backfill arouna
pipes can reasonably be paraphrased to read:
"Backfill shall be measured by the cubic yards of
material in final position in excavated area * **
limited as follows: * * *
"On pipes, measurement may not exceed a rectangle formed by vertical planes two feet wider
that the outside pipe diameter and one-half of the
pipe diameter over the top of the pipe, limited to
two feet."
The foregoing interpretation makes more sense than
that chosen by the Commission, even if other contractual
provisions and extrinsic circumstances are not consid·
ered. 'Vhen they are considered, the interpretation is de·
mantled.
The following facts are important in interpreting
the specification:
I. The specification was a new one, and this was one
of the first contracts in which it was of any substantial
importance.

2. Pipes are not ordinarily placed in rectangular

trenches. The "General Safety Orders Covering Vtaf
Industries," published by the Industrial Commission ol
Utah (Ex. 7-P), requires either the sloping or the shor·

1

16

ing, sheeting and bracing of excavations for trenches. It
is customary to slope rather than shore ( R. 94) .
3. 111 the contrad specifications relating to granular
backfill around underdrains (substantially the same as
backfill around pipes) the specification expressly prorides for exclusion of the volume of the pipe.

4. The Gibbons and Reed estimators who prepared
the bids discussed the matter and actually interpreted
the provision as not requiring deduction for pipe.

5. At least one of the Commission's resident en-

gineers interpreted the provision as not requiring deduction for the pipe.
6. Gibbons and Reed Company, which interpreted
the specification as it did, was experienced and knowleugable in the contracting business.
7. In Commission contracts there are several in~tances in which pipe volume is disregarded in measuring
for payments, e.g., in roadway excavation, placement of
concrete, excavations for salvaging and relaying pipe.

8. The rectangle used in describing the area for

11hich payment is to made is an arbitrary figure representing less material than is actually placed in a typical
excavation.
9. Since the contract was not a negotiated one, the
eontractor was not free to discuss the meaning of the
specification with or to obtain clarification from the
Commission.

17

10. The fact that the contract provision was amen1J.

ed by the Commission shows that the Commissior.
thought it was ambiguous.

In Orren v. Phoenix Insurance Company, rn

N.,V.2d 166 (Minn. 1970) there was a dispute as fo
whether a limitation in an insurance policy applied to"
single or aggregate loss. After a dispute arose the insur.
ance policy provisions were amended to expressly pm
vide that an aggregate loss was meant. The insured of.
fered evidence of the subsequent amendment, to whicl1
the insurer objected on the grounds that it was irrelevan!
and that it was incompetent for policy reasons. The Su·
preme Court of Minnesota said:
·
".Moreover, in our opinion, the change in language made in the revised policy persuasive!)
illustrates the ambiguity. The defendant, by adding the words 'in the aggregate' has precisely staled what it attempted to state in the policy issue1l
to plaintiff's. Nor did the court err in giving evidential consideration to the language of the later
policy over defendant's objection of irrelevancy.
Clearly, on the decisive issue of whether or not the
language of the 1966 policy is ambiguous, the revised language is relevant. Once it is establishe.c
that the policy is in fact that of defendant, as th11
record requires us to assume, the revised languag1
is admissible as a written admission by defendant.
conflictin,q with its contention at trial that the sim·
ilar provision in its 1.9(Jf1 policy is clear and url!1m· .
biguous. [citing cases J We also find no merit 1n
def enclant' s argument before this court that the
language revision should be excluded for the sa!llf
reason that eYidence of alterations or repairs after

18

an accident is excluded in a negligence case. As
defendant points out, the policy behind that rule
is that the admission of such facts would discourage such persons from improving or repairing the
injury-causing agent because they would fear
evidential use of such acts to their disadvantage.
See, \Vigmore, Evidence ( 3 Ed.) §283. That
policy does not, however, apply to this case. Unlike the typical situati~m in a negligence case, the
defendants' failure to change the policy language
works only to the detriment of the defendant and
does not endanger the safety of the public. As has
been noted, ambiguous language in an insurance
policy must be construed against the insurer.
Thus, given ambiguous language, it is to the insurer's benefit to change it and the failure to do so
exposes the insurer to the risk of an interpretatiou favorable to the insured." [Emphasis added}
id. at 169.

II
The contractor's interpretation of the ambiguous
contractual provision was reasonable and should have
been adopted as against the party who wrote the proviswn.
The contract before the court, including the 1968
interim specifications, was written by the Commission.
The ambiguous specification, therefore, must be construed strictly against the Commission. See Huber ~
R01L'l1111d Constrnction Co. v. City of South Salt Lake,
i lTtah 2d 273, 823 P.2d 258 (1958); Gregerson v.
Equitable Life q; Casualty Ins. Co., 123 Utah 152, 256

19

ant's interpretations lie within the zone of reasonableness; neither appears to rest on an obvious
error in drafting, a gross discrepancy, or an inadvertent but glaring gap; the arguments, rather,
are quite closely in balance. It is precisely to this
type of contract that this court has applied the
rule that if some substantive provision of a government-drawn agreement is fairly susceptible of
a certain construction and the contractor actually
and reasonably so construes it, in the course of
bidding or performance, that is the interpretation
which will be adopted-unless the partys' intention is otherwise affirmatively revealed. * * *
"This rule is fair both to the drafters and those
who are required to accept or reject the contract
as proffered, without haggling. Although the potential contractor may have some duty to inquire
about a major patent discrepancy or obvious
omission, or a drastic conflict in provisions * * *
he is not normally required (absent a clear warning in the contract) to seek clarification of any
and all ambiguities, doubts, or possible differences
in interpretation. The government, as the author,
has to shoulder the major task of seeing that within the zone of reasonableness the words of the
agreement communicate the proper notions-as
well as the main risk of a failure to carry that responsibility." id. at 876-877.

W. G. Cornell Company of Washington, D.C., Inc.
The United States, 376 F.2d 299 (Ct. Cl. 1967) inrolved a question of whether specifications permitted
flexible as well as rigid types of insulation within supply
and return ducts of an air conditioning system. The govrniment relied upon a federal specification incorporated
;n the <.'.ontract which required rigid material, while the
t'.

21

P.2d 566 ( 1953); 1'he Continental Bank and Tru
Company v. Bybee et al., G Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 7i:

:
1

1

( 1957).

That is not to say that the company may adopt am
interpretation of the contract it wishes. 'Ve recogniz~
that the interpretation claimed by the non-drafting parh
must be a permissible one under the language of the con
tract and the context in which it was prepared or, as som1
courts say, the interpretation must have been "reasonable."
In WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. The United Statei.
323 F.2d 87 4 (Ct. Cl. 1968) the court was called upon
to interpret a contract prepared by the government. Tht
dispute involved a question of whether five componentl
of generator sets had to be manufactured by (or witn
lhe authorization of) certain named companies, a)
claimed by the government ,or whether plaintiff was en·
titled under the contract to furnish identical componen!i
made by other firms. The government relied in large par!
upon references to specific part numbers designed b:
particular fabricators while the contractor emphasize1l
the lack of express mandatory language. In resolving tht
dispute the court said:
"The summar,\' of the opposing contentions. ii
enough to show that no sure guide to the solution
of the problem can be found within the four cor·
ners of the contraclual document. As with s
many other agreements, there is something fur
each party and no ready answer can be drawi:
from the texts alone. Both plaintiff's and defeno·
11
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('nntrnPt<w reli1·d 1111 rt 1111rfi,111 111' tlw lt'1·lrniPrd prnYisiiq
:.i.u<l sµn:ificaliuu,:; µennitlcd tl1L'. use ui "utl1cr e4u:ill

suitable material." In its decision the court quoted \\Ji
apprornl ll ul-Gar iJianufacturiny Corp. v. Unifi
States, HW Ct. CI. :38-1<, i351 F.:M 97i ( 1965), tot~
effect that an interpretatiou will he preferred which gin
a reasonable meaning to all parts of an instrument rath1
than an interpretation which leaves a portion of the co:
tract useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insigniL
cant, meaningless or superfluous. The court added:
"In my opinion, the technical provisious and sper
fications incorporated in the contract are ambigi1
ous and this tact is il!ustrated by the conftictin;
interpretations µlaced upon them by the partie:
which joined in giving birth to this lawsuit. Wht
the provisions are considered together, as the
must be, it is apparent that more than one reasor:
able conclusion can be reached. That is to say,,
appears to me that the meaning of these pror1
sions is not so explicit as to put the contractor
notice that only rigid insulation would be accept
e d . * * ,_,.
11

"It is clear plaintiff did not consider that the sp1
cif ications furnished by the government were ur
clear, ambiguous, or subject to a constructiondil
ferent than the one given to them by plaintil:
The record shows that plaintiff prepared its b1
and planned and attempted to perform th~ co:
tract work, in a manner consistent with its mtei
pretation and construction of the contract sp~~if'
cation'>. Plaintiff gave a meaning to the sped.1r.i
tions which, in light of its knowledge of how suu
lar contracts had been treated in the past, was !1
1

1

1
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unreasonable or in any way improper under the
circumstances.
''I am very careful to distinguish this case from
those decisions which impose the duty on the contractor to make inquiry of the government when
he is presented with contract specifications disclosing 'an obvious omission, inconsistency, or
discrepancy of significance.' * * * It is not every
possible ambiguity or doubt which creates such
duty. And 'within the zone of reasonableness,' the
risk of a difference of interpretation must be
borne by the government." id. at 309-310.

Ii

One of the most frequently cited government contract cases is Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. United States,
109 Ct. C 1. 390 ( 1947) , wherein the court said:

"* * *

JI

n

i

ti

'Vhere the government draws specifications which are fairly susceptible of a certain construction and the contractor actually and reasonably so construes them, justice and equity require
that that construction be adopted. 'Vhere one of
the parties to a contract draws a document and
uses therein language which is susceptible of more
than one meaning, and the intention of the parties does not otherwise appear, that meaning will
be given the document which is more favorable to
the party who did not draw it. The rule is especially applicable to government contracts where
the contractor has nothing to say as to its provisions." id. at 418.

The experience and competence of Gibbons and
Reed Company in highway construction should be taken
:,\ into account in arriving at a determination of whether
the meaning given to the provision by the company was
11
a reasonable one.
23
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In D ~ L Construction Co. ~ Associates v. Unite
States, 402 l<'.~d 990 (Ct. Cl. l!.)()8) the court said:

"From the record as a whole we derive a viewo
plaintiff, not in retrospect, but within the actua
factual environment as of the time of the prepa
ration of its bid, as it studied the many contrac
documents, including numerous drawings arn
specifications with literally thousands upon thou
sands of details involved in a sizeable construe
tion project. * * * Plaintiff had extensive experi
ence in constructing mass produced housing, in
eluding several Capehart Housing projects i1
which there had been a generaliy consistent pal
tern, of uniform foundations, footings and sten
walls. 'i'his experience, under somewhat simila
contracts, may be considered in determining th
reasonableness of plaintiff's interpretation of th
contract documents." [Emphasis added.] id. a

994.

Under the rule of contra preferentum, the com
pany's interpretation should have been adopted by th
court. This is true whether the rule is regarded as re
quiring a "strict construction" against the party usin1
words, or as requiring adoption of the meaning of th
other party "within the zone of reasonableness." A
pointed out in the analysis under Point I of the brief, tl1
provision relating to measurement for backfill can o
reasonably interpreted as establishing a simple rectangi:
lar method for computing the amount of backfill, will
out regard to the volume of the pipe. This construction
supported not only by the other contractual provision
hut by the fact that the Commission, by its own admi~
sion, viewed the provision as being ambiguous, that ke
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personnel un the staff of the resident engineer had doubt
as to the clarity, and that at least one other resident engineer of the Commission interpreted the agreement as
the company did. It is of some significance too, that the
use of a rectangle for computation purposes involves a
rather simple mathematical concept, while deduction for
the volume of the pipe involves a complicated formula,
and that the resident engineer in charge of the project
acknowledged that it doesn't make any difference
whether the volume of the pipe was included or excluded
so long as the method of measurement is known ( R. 103).
CONCLUSION
For the belt route project Gibbons and Reed Company had to prepare a bid under a set of specificatio~s
which were new to it and to the Road Commission. It
considered the "backfill" specification in light of other
contractual provisions and its experience as a highway
contractor for many years. It adopted an interpretation
1rhich under the circumstances was reasonable, and inasmuch as the Road Commission prepared the contractual
documents, that interpretation should be adopted by the
court.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYCE E. ROE
ROE, FO,iVLER, JERMAN & DART
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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